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'After the Destruction of the King in Great Britain, a more
pure and unmixed tyranny sprang up in the parliament than
had been exercised by the monarch."
-James Wilson
1
"[I]f the whole legislature ... should attempt to overleap the
bounds, prescribed to them by the people, I, in administering the
public justice of the country, will ... [point] to the constitution,
[and] will say ... here is the limit of your authority; and hither,
shall you go, but no further."
-George Wythe, Commonwealth v. Caton
2
INTRODUCTION
John Adams once defined a "republic" as "a government of laws
and not of men."3 Even Adams would acknowledge, however, that
laws must have their limits, and that men, as the makers and
interpreters of laws, must necessarily define what those limits are.4
1. JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 408 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown
Scott eds., Oxford University Press 1920) [hereinafter MADISON, DEBATES].
2. 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 8 (1782).
3. MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXX; JOHN ADAMS, NOVANGUS (1774), reprinted in 4 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 99, 106 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1969) (1856); see also THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, reprinted in COMMON SENSE, THE
RIGHTS OF MAN, AND OTHER ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 23, 48-49 (Sidney Hook
ed., NAL Penguin Inc. 1969) (1776) ("But where, says some, is the King of America? I'll tell
you. Friend, he reigns above, and doth not make havoc of mankind like the Royal Brute of
Britain. Yet that we may not appear to be defective even in earthly honors, let a day be
solemnly set apart for proclaiming the charter; let it be brought forth [and] placed on the
divine law, the word of God; let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know, that
so far we approve of monarchy, that in America THE LAW IS KING.").
4. See JOHN ADAMS, THOUGHTS ON GOVERNMENT (1776), reprinted in THE WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 3, at 193, 198 (describing the division of power between the three
branches of government to prevent any branch from surpassing the constitutionally imposed
limitations on its power ("[T]he judicial power ought to be distinct from both the legislative
and executive, and independent upon both, that so it may be a check upon both, as both
should be checks upon that.")). In fact, Professor Scott Gerber notes that the Framers,
particularly those in Virginia, relied on John Adams's early writings about the judiciary's role
in keeping lawmakers within their proper bounds in canonizing the state courts' power of
judicial review. Scott D. Gerber, The Political Theory of an Independent Judiciary, 116 YALE
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Indeed, in the American legal system, the idea that men can
invalidate legislation that directly contradicts the Constitution has
become an almost axiomatic constitutional directive. Not only does
the Constitution itself implicitly support this position,5 but the
nullification of unconstitutional laws is also consistent with Amer-
ica's early political climate, which emphasized contractual con-
straints upon government authority6 and the necessity of limited
government power.7
This anxiety toward overzealous government, as well as the
legislative power that such a government would entail, is ubiqui-
tously manifest within the Founding documents. In Federalist No.
1, for example, Alexander Hamilton cautioned readers against one
of the proposed Constitution's main criticisms: that the national
government would expand its powers at the expense of individual
and state liberty.' "An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency
of government," he wrote, "will be stigmatized as the offspring of a
temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of
liberty."9 Madison echoed Hamilton's reassurances, reminding the
Constitution's skeptics that the Framers had created "neither [a]
wholly national nor [a] wholly federal"1 ° political system that would
L.J. POCKET PART 223, 228 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/01/09/gerber.html.
5. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 ('This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." (emphasis added)); see also THE FEDERALIST No.
78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ('The Constitution ought to be
preferred to the statute ....").
6. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
268-70 (1969) (discussing the notion of constitutions as contracts that limit the powers that
the government may properly exercise).
7. See AKHL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 60 (2005) ("Jefferson
and Madison aimed to structure government power so as to promote compliance with the
specific legal rights and rules established by the underlying state or federal constitution itself.
Thus Jefferson spoke of enforcing the legal limits' on each part of government, and Madison
claimed that the federal Constitution's very structure would maintain the rules laid down in
the Constitution,' would keep the branches in their constitutionally 'proper' places, and would
thus safeguard 'public rights' and 'the rights of the people' against improper 'encroach-
ments."').
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 29.
9. Id.
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 242.
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prove incapable of abusing its delineated constitutional authority."
This desire to prevent the national government from perverting its
inherently limited capabilities continued even after the Constitu-
tion's ratification. In Washington's administration, for instance,
Thomas Jefferson opposed Congress's ability to pass a bill authoriz-
ing the creation of a national bank. 'To take a single step beyond
the boundaries [of the Constitution]," Jefferson wrote, "is to take
possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any
definition."'2
And yet, despite the Framers' apparent agreement that the
national government-and more specifically, the national legisla-
ture-should not overstep its proper bounds, Madison's notes from
the Constitutional Convention contain scant evidence that the
delegates favorably discussed judicial review. 3 Even more puzzling
is the fact that the Convention delegates only briefly mentioned
other potential mechanisms (e.g., presidential review) for remedying
the passage of unconstitutional statutes.14 Certainly, this lack of
clarity did not mean that the Framers granted to Congress an
unlimited legislative power. To the contrary, The Federalist warned
that "[t]he legislative department is everywhere extending the
sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex."'5 Given the legislature's propensity to increase its own
lawmaking prerogative, some Founders advocated the necessity of
imposing constitutional limits that would prevent Congress from
11. See id. Madison also noted that delegated powers should be narrowly construed. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 258 ("It has been urged and
echoed that the power 'to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts,
and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States,' amounts to an
unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be necessary for the
common defense or general welfare. No stronger proof could be given of the distress under
which these writers labor for objections, than their stooping to such a misconstruction.").
12. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791),
reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 416, 416 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
13. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 885, 904 (1985) ("[Ihe Philadelphia framers did not discuss in detail how they intended
their end product to be interpreted .... "). But see MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 1, at 51
(noting that James Wilson had originally suggested the possibility of jointly vesting the
President and the Supreme Court with an absolute veto).
14. See, e.g., infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 306.
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either adjudicating" or enforcing 7 its own legislation. In other
words, they wished to avoid a system in which the legislature would
"decid[e] rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy,
[or to] the direction of the executive."'8 This emphasis on the ability
of the legislature's coordinate branches to "decide rights" seemed to
indicate that those branches might each possess some nominal
degree of interpretive sovereignty with which no other branch, least
of all Congress, could constitutionally interfere. For some Framers,
then, the Constitution appeared to defend a system that vested each
branch with the ability to make its own constitutional judgments.
Despite this apparent belief in constitutional review, however, the
Framers failed to indicate how each branch's interpretations would
relate to each other, to define the areas in which each branch's
interpretations would predominate, or to identify what each
branch's sphere of constitutional interpretation could permissibly
include. In short, even though the Founders clearly intended a
system that vested the power to review congressional legislation in
multiple constitutional actors (namely, the President and the
Supreme Court), they did not specify exactly how that interpretive
power should be divided.'9 In so doing, the Framers rendered their
constitutional creation incomplete. By leaving open the possibility
that multiple constitutional actors might disagree about a stat-
ute's constitutionality, the Framers appeared to have unwittingly
inhibited the political system's ability to control unconstitutional
legislation.
Because the Framers obviously sought to prevent the national
government's ability to overstep its proper bounds by passing such
legislation, this Note seeks to reexamine the indicia of constitutional
review that the Framers sewed into the fabric of the American legal
system. It then argues that the Framers intended to create a system
that honored departmentalism, but that also filtered department-
16. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 300 (quoting
Montesquieu ("Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator.")).
17. See, e.g., id. (quoting Montesquieu ('"When the legislative and the executive powers
are united in the same person or body,' says he, 'there can be no liberty, because
apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws to
execute them in a tyrannical manner.-)).
18. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 308.
19. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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alism through an informal heirarchy of multilayered constitutional
review. This informal hierarchy best reflected a departmental
system of deductive judicial supremacy, in which each branch of the
national government engages in constitutional review, but in which
the Supreme Court provides the most telling assessments of
constitutionality.'
This Note is pertinent because, as Professors Gary Lawson and
Christopher Moore documented only a decade ago, "no one ... has
even attempted to put forth a plausible originalist case for a
generalized judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation.
Instead, those who defend judicial supremacy ... have done so on
grounds unrelated to the Constitution's original public meaning."21
This Note seeks to provide precisely what Lawson and Moore claim
is lacking in constitutional scholarship: an originalist case for
judicial supremacy that properly takes into account the Founders'
consideration of both judicial and presidential review. In so doing,
this Note attempts to define the Founders' political creation in
understandable and concrete constitutional terms.
Part I lays the groundwork for the existence of American consti-
tutional review. Parts II and III examine two forms of this constitu-
tional review: judicial and presidential review. Part IV introduces
American departmental theory of government and explains the
modern concept of deductive judicial supremacy. Finally, Part V
proposes a paradigm to explain the interrelation of presidential and
judicial review in the multilayered interpretive framework that the
Framers created. In so doing, it likens the Framers' proposed
system to the modern notion of deductive judicial supremacy-
though in a way that takes into account the executive and the
judiciary's comparative relationship to the legislature instead of
simply considering the Supreme Court and the legislature alone.
Methodologically, this Note appears to operate upon a contestable
premise: that the intent of the "Framers" can be properly discerned.
With this limitation in mind, this Note does not seek to establish
that every Framer intended there to be presidential review, judicial
review, or some combination of the two-as such a proposition could
20. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 348 U.S. 579, 637 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
21. Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1292 (1996).
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be easily disproven by even the most cursory glance at the historical
record.22 Nor does it aim to standardize the Framers' beliefs about
whether the President's or the Supreme Court's constitutional
determinations should predominate. Rather, this Note means to
show that by supporting judicial and presidential review, the
Framers intended to establish an interpretive departmentalist
paradigm that is best characterized as a system of deductive judicial
supremacy. It is this limited proposition, as well as the underlying
analytical methodology supporting it, for which this Note makes a
valuable legal contribution. 8
In documenting the Framers' generalized intent, this Note does
not suggest that "original intent" is the appropriate canon to guide
modern constitutional interpretation. In fact, some Framers
outwardly opposed the use of intent.24 This Note merely aims to
document how the Framers intended each component of departmen-
tal constitutional review to one another, briefly contend that these
structural intentions form one plausible way to reconcile
departmentalism with judicial supremacy, and advise that the
Framers' general intent in the area of departmental constitutional
22. Indeed, many Framers did not believe in the idea of judicial review, and still others
opposed the idea of a powerful executive that was capable of interpreting congressional
legislation. See discussion infra Part III.A.1; see also Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204, 214 (1980) ("lAin intentionalist must
necessarily use circumstantial evidence to educe a collective or general intent."). For this
reason, this Note aims to provide a generalized, moderate intentionalist view of the
interpretive relationship between the presidency and the Supreme Court. See id. (arguing
that it is justifiable for moderate originalists to treat the particular Framers' writings or
statements as evidence of the Framers' generalized intent). It does not broadly advocate
original intent as a workable canon of constitutional interpretation, but merely documents
the Framers' intentions as they pertain to departmental constitutional review and infers
the hierarchical way in which the Framers designed such departmental review to operate.
This Note thus avoids many of the pitfalls inherent to the canon of original intent. See, e.g.,
id. at 221 ('The act of translation required [for those who advocate original intent] ...
involves the counterfactual and imaginary act of projecting the adopters' concepts and
attitudes into a future they probably could not have envisioned. When the interpreter engages
in this sort of projection, she is in a fantasy world more of her own than of the adopters'
making.").
23. For the sake of clarification, this Note uses the terms "Founders" and "Framers"
interchangeably.
24. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CoNSTITurION 89 (2004) (quoting
Edmund Randolph ("But ought not the constitution to be decided on by the import of its own




review coincides with the enduring, pragmatic integrity of the
Constitution itself. Rather than focus purely on the constitutional
text ("interpretation"), this Note documents the Framers' intent in
a way that informs the inter-branch structure that the text created.
In so doing, it does not see to transcribe the original meaning of the
text itself-as the Constitution contains virtually no express,
textual guidance on the issue of how judicial and presidential review
should interrelate." Instead, this Note articulates a workable
framework for governmental actors to implement ("construction")
that is both consistent with the Framers' intentions and the
Constitution that they created, and workable as a matter of
structural constitutional law.
I. THE PRAGMATIC REASONING BEHIND THE FRAMERS' VISION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
As Madison famously argued in Federalist No. 51, "If men were
angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men," he continued, "the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place oblige it to control itself."26 Madison's predilections
resonated well with other Framers, who aimed both to define firmly
the bounds of the national government and to counteract the
partisanship of governmental actors through a system of enumer-
ated checks and balances.27 This system included certain internal
checks (often pitting each branch against one another) and
external checks (which took into account a "pluralistic view" of
society and made it difficult for any one group to control the na-
25. For more guidance on the original public meaning canon of constitutional inter-
pretation, see generally id.; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 4 (Illinois Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Research Working Group, Paper No. 07-24), available at http://papers.
ssrn.comabstract= 1120244 ("[O]riginal public meaning originalists believe that the original
meaning of the Constitution is a function of the original public meaning (or 'conventional
semantic meaning) of a given constitutional provision at the time the provision was framed
and ratified.").
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 319.
27. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM 50 (1970).
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tional government).28 The Framers wove these checks throughout
the Constitution's procedural framework-making clear that each
branch possessed some nominal degree of autonomy from its
coordinate branches, and that a system that delegated powers to all
branches would be most capable of controlling the excesses of any
one. 
29
In the legislative process, however, the enumerated consti-
tutional checks and balances are decidedly front-loaded. Although
the Constitution imposes qualifications on Representatives ° and
Senators31 to help filter against unwise legislation,3 2 specifies a
general method by which laws are to be passed,33 and prescribes a
list of the areas in which Congress may appropriately legislate,34 the
text does not expressly prescribe any particular process for overturn-
ing legislation that might satisfy the necessary procedural prerequi-
sites, but might nevertheless be substantively unconstitutional.35
28. Id. at 54-55. This view represented that held by Jefferson, Adams, and Madison. Id.
at 55 ("Like John Adams, [Madison] saw with great clarity the importance of supplementing
the internal balance of the constitution with the external balance of the various interests and
forces that made up society. Here Madisonian pluralism owes a great deal to the example of
religious toleration and religious liberty that had already been established in eighteenth-
century America.").
29. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (giving the Senate "the sole power to try all
Impeachments"); art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power to override vetoes); art. II, §
2, cl. 1 (giving the President the power to pardon); art. III, § 2 (according the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction "[iun all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls," and those in which a State shall be party).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
32. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison), supra note 5, 374-75 ("The propriety of
[the distinctions between the qualifications for the House of Representatives and the Senate]
is explained by the nature of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent of
information and stability of character, requires at the same time that the senator should have
reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages; and which, participating
immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not
thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and
education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total
exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the public
confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel
for foreign influence on the national councils.").
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
35. Indeed, Article III only provides that:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
2224
CLARIFYING DEPARTMENTALISM
Similarly, it does not indicate the standard that the body responsi-
ble for overturning such unconstitutional legislation should use in
making its determinations, or advise how the constitutional
judgments of each branch should relate to each other.
One explanation for these omissions is that the Framers did not
foresee that a properly designed constitutional system, in which
checks and balances play so crucial a role in the legislative process,
would ever produce unconstitutional laws. Convention Delegate
John Mercer, for example, thought that the sort of laws resulting
from the Constitution's legislative matrix "ought to be well and
cautiously made, and then ... be uncontroulable." 6 Mercer's logic
implied that the front-loaded system of checks and balances37 would
serve preemptively to neutralize any unconstitutional actions that
poisoned otherwise proper legislation, and that any determinations
of constitutionality would necessarily occur at the time when
Congress initially contemplated legislation rather than the date
when that legislation ultimately took effect. As a result, Mercer
viewed judicial review-and presumably any form of constitutional
review-as an unnecessary "interference ... in the Legislative
business."3
Mercer's logic seems counterintuitive, however, when placed
within the context of a Constitution that stressed internal checks
on each branch's power. Considering the Framers' proclivities
toward limited government, the more plausible explanation for the
Constitution's lack of specificity about constitutional review is that
many Convention delegates simply assumed that the government
they established would necessarily entail it.39 To assume other-
wise-that is, to defend a system in which the legislature serves as
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Similarly, Article II affords the President a limited veto on legislative
enactments. See infra Part III.C. 1.
36. MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 1, at 406.
37. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
38. MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 1, at 406 (quoting Charles Pinkney's opposition to
judicial interference in Legislative business).
39. See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502,
507-08 (2006).
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the sole judge of its actions-would be to contradict the constitu-
tional framework defended in The Federalist.
Certainly, The Federalist specified that "none of [the three
branches of government] ought to possess, directly or indirectly,
an overruling influence over the others in the administration of
their respective powers."4 ° But, again, Madison also argued that the
legislature is the most powerful branch41 and suggested the real
possibility that it could, contrary to Mercer's views, expand beyond
its delegated authority in ways detrimental to its coordinate
branches.42 Constitutional review proved necessary, then, to prevent
this sort of legislative monolith from forming.
To be sure, Congress could still pass unconstitutional laws, but
those laws must overcome, as Akhil Amar explains, "an ingenious
system of constitutional checks and choke points designed to
minimize the likelihood that arguably unconstitutional federal
law[s] would pass and take effect."43 Even if such laws do pass, and
"constitutional interpreters outside the legislature deemed [those
laws to be] unconstitutional, they could-via executive pardons and
nonenforcement, ... judicial review, ... and the like-render the
statute a virtual dead letter...."" This separation of interpretive
discretion that Amar describes, which made possible the substantive
invalidation of otherwise procedurally proper legislation, became
"for many Americans an 'essential precaution in favor of liberty."'45
Amar's perspective on the necessity of constitutional review is also
consistent with Alexander Hamilton's rationale in Federalist No. 78.
Writing that "[n]o legislative act ... contrary to the Constitution, can
be valid," for example, Hamilton emphatically argued in favor of
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 305.
41. Id. at 307.
42. Id. ("It is not unfrequently a question of real nicety in legislative bodies whether the
operation of a particular measure will, or will not, extend beyond the legislative sphere. On
the other side, the executive power being restrained within a narrower compass and being
more simple in its nature, and the judiciary being described by landmarks still less uncertain,
projects of usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and defeat
themselves. Nor is this all: as the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of
the people, and has in some constitutions full discretion, and in all a prevailing influence, over
the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other departments, a dependence is thus created
in the latter, which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former.").
43. AMAR, supra note 7, at 62.
44. Id.
45. WOOD, supra note 6, at 549.
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limiting Congress's power. 'To deny [that the Constitution super-
sedes congressional authority]," Hamilton wrote, "would be to affirm
that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is
above his master... that men acting by virtue of powers may do not
only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid."46
In light of these systematic restraints, it is hardly surprising that
many of the Founders supported checks on the legislature similar
to the limitations imposed on other elements of the new national
government. If, as Mercer claimed, there was no constitutional
review in the American legal system, then that system would be less
capable of controlling legislative abuse. Rather than check one
branch's power against another, the legislature would serve as the
judge of its own strength.47 This self-monitoring discretion would
permit the legislature potentially to expand beyond the enumerated
bounds outlined in Article I-to the point that it infringed upon the
powers of either the other two branches, or upon the powers of the
states.
The Constitution's failure to provide explicitly for substantive
review of constitutional determinations,4" then, need not prevent
such review from taking place. As Madison noted in Federalist No.
48, "a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits
of the several departments is not a sufficient guard against those
encroachments which lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the
powers of government in the same hands."4 Put differently, the
Constitution's textual system of checks and balances might not
always be sufficient to withstand the aggregation of power into the
hands of a particular branch, especially in the legislative context. If
the Framers envisioned no extra textual mechanism to adjudicate
the constitutionality of legislative actions, there would be no way to
ensure that legislative actions remained faithful to the constitu-
tional text. With congressional self interest in reelection"° and its
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 466.
47. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., infra note 105 and accompanying text.
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 313.
50. See THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 327 ("[The House of
Representatives] should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with,
the people.") (emphasis added). The Senate, of course, was not popularly elected until 1913.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. However, Madison's second point-that Congress as a whole has
a tendency to expand its own powers-holds as true for the Senate as it does for the House.
22272009]
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tendency to impede upon the other branches by drawing their
powers into its own "impetuous vortex," 1 the need for an additional
legislative check becomes even more apparent.
The real question, then, is not whether the Founders authorized
constitutional review, but how they designed such review to
occur-through a joint effort by two equally powerful branches, or
through a system in which each branch would possess some
interpretive autonomy, but which vested one branch with a wider
swath of constitutional deference. To understand how the Framers
distributed the power of constitutional review between the
branches, however, it is first necessary to understand how they
envisioned the power itself.
II. JuDcIAL REVIEW
Louis Jaffe once wrote that "[t]he availability of judicial review is
the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system
of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or legally
valid."52 Despite the fact that the Framers did not discuss judicial
review in substantial depth at the Constitutional Convention, 53 the
historical evidence suggests that many of them nevertheless
regarded it with the same deference as Jaffe did when he wrote in
the mid-twentieth century.
A. State Judicial Review
1. The Foundations of State Judicial Review
Even before the Constitutional Convention, judicial review
possessed a rich history at the state level. Professor Mary Sarah
Bilder, for instance, argues "that judicial review was initially taken
for granted" because the Founders "presumed that courts would void
legislation that was repugnant or contrary to a [state] constitu-
tion."54 Bilder claimed that the Founders largely accepted judicial
See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 309.
52. Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARV. L. REV. 401, 401 (1958).
53. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
54. Bilder, supra note 39, at 507-08.
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review because it built upon a practice already deeply entrenched
in the fabric of colonial legal interpretation: corporate charters. 55 In
other words, England had structured colonial settlements, including
Virginia and Massachusetts Bay, as "corporations,' 56 and "[c]or-
porate treatises declared that corporate bylaws could not be
repugnant to the laws of the nation."57 As a consequence of colonial
courts' routine hierarchical evaluation of corporate charters against
the backdrop of English law, the Founders' experience with those
charters might have intellectually predisposed them to accept the
hierarchical system of federal constitutional review-under which
courts similarly evaluated laws based on their incompatibility with,
or repugnancy to, the United States Constitution. 58
Judicial review proved especially widespread in Virginia. Every
member of the Virginia ratifying convention who spoke on judicial
review, for example, supported the practice. 9 Patrick Henry argued
in its favor, claiming that the Virginia state judges in the Case of
the Prisoners0 "had [the] fortitude to declare that they were the
Judiciary and would oppose unconstitutional acts."6" Similarly, John
Marshall wrote that "[i]f [Congress made] a law not warranted by
any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the Judges
as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard ....
[and] [t]hey would declare it void." 2 Other supporters of judicial
review included the first U.S. Attorney General Edmund Randolph,
55. See id.
56. Id. at 535.
57. Id. at 514 (emphasis added).
58. See id. at 511. The Framers'corporate-based familiarity with judicial review, however,
did not mean that the Framers viewed states as corporations. In fact, quite the opposite. See,
e.g., James Wilson, Speech on the Constitution (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in FOUNDING
AMERICA: DOCUMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS 425 (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
2006); see also Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail The Eleventh Amendment and the
Background Principle of Strict Construction, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1577, 1692 (2009)
(documenting how some Founders-namely, Massachusetts's James Sullivan--did not think
states should be reduced "to mere nonsovereign corporation[s]" or completely consolidated
under "a solely sovereign national government").
59. William Michael Treanor, The Case of the Prisoners and the Origins of Judicial
Review, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 491, 562 (1994) [hereinafter Treanor, Prisoners].
60. Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782).
61. Treanor, Prisoners, supra note 59, at 563 (quoting 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OFTHE CONSTITUTION 1219 (John P. Kaminiski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
1990) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]).
62. Id. (quoting 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 61, at 1431).
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William Grayson (who argued that judicial review provided a means
to check an oppressive Congress), George Mason (who spoke of the
judiciary's ability to declare certain laws-specifically, ex post facto
laws-unconstitutional), and Edmund Pendleton (who claimed that
"honest judges" would never submit to unconstitutional laws)."
Given the political climate out of which Virginia attorneys
grew, Virginians' support for judicial review was not surprising.
In addition to the Case of the Prisoners, in which a Virginia court
first declared a state law unconstitutional,64 Virginians had also
witnessed Kamper v. Hawkins,5 in which the court explicitly
exercised judicial review on the basis that "the people were 'the only
sovereign power,"' and that the legislature remained subordinate to
people's wishes.66 As an advocate in Kamper, St. George Tucker had
no problem advocating for judicial oversight of legislative actions,
despite the fact that the Virginia Constitution's drafters' had not
explicitly included judicial review in the text of the constitution
itself.67 In so doing, Tucker implicitly claimed that constitutions
included the concept of extra textual checks on improper legislation,
and that judges' ability effectively to adjudicate cases necessarily
entailed an ability to make determinations of substantive legal
validity about laws that in some way undermined the constitutions
that the popular will had charged them to uphold.68 This Virginia
precedent favoring judicial review unquestionably influenced
Marshall's decision in Marbury v. Madison,69 in which the Supreme
Court famously rubberstamped judicial review by reiterating that
"[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is."7"
63. Id. at 563 n.338.
64. Id. at 569. In this case, future United States Attorney General Edmund Randolph
argued on behalf of the state, but contrary to the interest of his client, argued that the court
had the power to hold a state statute unconstitutional. Id. at 507.
65. 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1793).
66. CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF
LAW 65 (1996).
67. Cf. Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI.
L. REv. 887, 927 (2003) [hereinafter Prakash & Yoo, Origins] (noting that several state courts
exercised judicial review despite the absence of an explicit provision in their state
constitutions authorizing them to do so).
68. See HOBSON, supra note 66, at 66.
69. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also HOBSON, supra note 66, at 66.
70. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
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2. The Spread of State Judicial Review
Other states also recognized the necessity of judicial review. New
York, for instance, created a "Council of Revision," which included
judges of the state supreme court, to veto improper legislation.7' In
seven other states, courts struck down statutes inconsistent with
the state's higher law.72 And in four of those seven states, parties
did not even challenge statutes that directly contradicted state
constitutions-indicating that the concept of state judicial review
"was apparently an expansive one" that vested judges with much
discretion in evaluating the constitutionality of laws, including
those that did not directly contradict state higher law.73
The Founders routinely supported state judges who struck down
improper legislation. In Rhode Island, for example, Madison lauded
"[jiudges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law."74 In
Massachusetts, Elbridge Gerry 5 praised the "general approbation"
with which other state judges had set aside inappropriate laws.7 6
And in Federalist No. 78, Hamilton commended state review of
unconstitutional legislation.77 In fact, by the time states had begun
to debate ratification, appreciation of judicial review had become so
widespread that "[d]elegates to the state conventions discussed
judicial review in no fewer than seven of the ratification con-
ventions in almost thirty instances," and "[o]utside the conventions,
Americans confirmed that the Constitution authorized judicial
review in pamphlets and in newspapers across twelve states."78 As
one South Carolina court emphatically held in Ham v. M'Claws,
"It is clear that statutes passed against the plain and obvious
71. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. III.
72. See Prakash & Yoo, Origins, supra note 67, at 933; see also William Michael Treanor,
Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 497 (2005) [hereinafter Treanor,
Judicial Review].
73. Treanor, Judicial Review, supra note 72, at 497.
74. Prakash & Yoo, Origins, supra note 67, at 934 (alteration in original).
75. Gerry, incidentally, represented one of three delegates who remained at the
Constitutional Convention until its conclusion, but not sign the final document. Gerry,
Elbridge Biographical Information, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index-g
000139 (last visited Mar. 14, 2009).
76. Prakash & Yoo, Origins, supra note 67, at 934 (internal citation omitted).
77. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 470-71.
78. Prakash & Yoo, Origins, supra note 67, at 928.
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principles of common right, and common reason, are absolutely null
and void ....""
B. National Judicial Review
The importance of judicial review in interpreting constitutions
at the state level' demonstrated the necessity of some form of
meaningful judicial review at the national level. In Federalist No.
78, for instance, Hamilton argued that "[a] constitution is, in fact,
and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
body."sl Hamilton further noted that "[t]he courts must declare the
sense of the law"82 and that "it is the province of the courts to
liquidate [contradictory statutes] and fix their meaning and
operation."83 This position belied Hamilton's support for the notion
that judicial review provided the best check against unconstitutional
legislation by preventing the legislature from judging the scope of
its own constitutional powers.' Indeed, Hamilton had served as one
of the early advocates for judicial review, arguing a case in 1784 in
which he "expounded the all-important doctrine judicial review-the
notion that high courts had a right to scrutinize laws and if
necessary declare them void."5
79. Treanor, Judicial Review, supra note 72, at 500 (quoting Ham v. M'Claws, 1 S.C.L. (1
Bay) 93, 98 (Ct. Com. P1. 1789)).
80. See Prakash & Yoo, Origins, supra note 67, at 932-33 ("A written constitution created
a focal point in pondering constitutional meaning and helped make possible judicial review.").
81. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 467.
82. Id. at 469.
83. Id. at 468.
84. Id. at 467 ("If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional
judges of their own powers and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon
the other departments it may be answered that this cannot be the natural presumption where
it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise
to be supposed that the Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people
to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose that the
courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature in
order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts." (second emphasis
added)).
85. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 198 (2004) (discussing the case of Rutgers v.
Waddington).
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Hamilton claimed to support judicial review, in part, because by
preventing the legislature from overstepping its proper bounds,
judicial review helped ensure that the constitutional system would
be most subservient to the American people. 6 Perhaps more
importantly, however, judicial review also served as a check against
the popular whims of the legislature by "keep [ing] the latter within
the limits assigned to [its] authority."" Practically speaking,
Hamilton believed that although the Founders did not create the
judicial power to be superior to the legislative power, "[t]he interpre-
tation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts,"88 and that judges must "declare the sense of the law."8 9
"[W]henever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution,"
Hamilton thus considered it "the duty of the judicial tribunals to
adhere to the latter and disregard the former. ''90
Conceptual support for national judicial review grew after a
Federalist Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798,91 at
which time many states opted to defer to the national judiciary
rather than accept the nullification propositions advanced in
Madison and Jefferson's Virginia and Kentucky resolutions.92 A
counter-resolution adopted in the New Hampshire House of
86. Id. at 467-68 ("[Tlhis conclusion [does not] by any means suppose a superiority of the
judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to
both, and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition
to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the
latter rather than the former."). The historical record supports the notion of judicial review
as a means to preserve popular sovereignty. Akhil Amar noted, for example, that "[u]nder
America's Constitution, founded on principles of popular sovereignty rather than legislative
supremacy, the gulf between vertical review of state laws and horizontal review of
congressional enactments would not seem quite so unbridgeable." AMAR, supra note 7, at 211.
As a result, Amar claimed, "America's judiciary would indeed have the authority to hear
claims that Congress had exceeded the powers given to it by the sovereign citizenry." Id.
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 467.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 469.
90. Id. at 468 (emphasis added).
91. See THE VIRGINIA REPORT OF 1799-1800, TOUCHING ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS;
TOGETHER WITH THE VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF DECEMBER 21, 1798, THE DEBATE AND
PROCEEDINGS THEREON IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF VIRGINIA, AND SEVERAL OTHER
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE REPORT AND RESOLUTIONS 17-21 (J.W. Randolph 1850)
[hereinafter VIRGINIA REPORT].
92. Resolutions of Virginia of December 21, 1798, in VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 91, at
27-28; Kentucky Resolution 10 Nov. 1798, 14 Nov. 1799, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION
131, 134-35 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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Representatives, for example, provided that-contrary to Madison
and Jefferson's implorations that states nullify unconstitutional
federal legislation--"the state legislatures are not the proper
tribunals to determine the constitutionality of the laws of the
general government, [and] that the duty of such decision is properly
and exclusively confided to the judicial department."93 Employing
similar reasoning, the Rhode Island legislature's counter-resolution
argued that the Constitution "vests in the federal courts exclusively,
and in the Supreme Court of the United States ultimately, the
authority of deciding on the constitutionality of any act or law of the
Congress of the United States. 94
According to Professors Prakash and Yoo, the reason for this
deference to the judiciary was clear: the Framers had quite clearly
envisioned courts' "duty" to preserve the Constitution by negating
the passage of unconstitutional laws.95 'Though people disagreed on
much else about the Constitution," they wrote, "all those who
addressed judicial review agreed that the Constitution authorized
the judiciary to ignore unconstitutional federal statutes."96 The
constitutional record supports Prakash and Yoo's opinion. When
Madison proposed a joint veto for the President and the Supreme
Court,9 for instance, Delegates George Mason and Luther Martin
objected. "Join [the Supreme Court] with the Executive in the
[veto]," Martin claimed, "and [the Court] will have a double nega-
tive."9" Though perhaps not intentional, Martin's statement implied
that the Supreme Court already possessed a "negative" ability to
declare laws unconstitutional through the process of judicial review.
Evidence favoring judicial review continued to mount shortly
after the Constitution's ratification. As Professor Wallace
Mendelson noted, by writing judicial review into the Judiciary Act
of 1789, the Founders "[left] no doubt that judicial review of national
legislation was generally contemplated before it was exercised by
93. State of New Hampshire, In the House of Representatives, June 14, 1799, in VIRGINIA
REPORT, supra note 91, at 176.
94. State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, In General Assembly, February,
A.D. 1799, in VIRGINIA REPORT, supra note 91, at 169.
95. See Prakash & Yoo, Origins, supra note 67, at 928.
96. Id.
97. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
98. MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 1, at 297.
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the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison."99 Needless to say, it
would have been impractical that the same Founders who had
authored the Constitution would construct the Judiciary Act of 1789
to encompass a potentially very dangerous power (e.g., judicial
review) if they did not intend the Constitution's text to permit it.
To be sure, judicial review had its critics. Delegate John
Dickinson, for example, joined Delegate Mercer in objecting to judg-
es' ability to set aside the law. According to Madison's Convention
notes, Dickinson made clear his reasoning: 'The Justiciary of
Arragon he observed became by degrees, the lawgiver."'0' Similarly,
not every Founder accepted state court bases for national judicial
review. Though the state court justices in the Case of the Prisoners
engaged in judicial review, for example, two of them did so without
mentioning judicial review, two said that they agreed with courts'
ability to declare statutes unconstitutional, but did not further
elaborate on the judicial review procedure, and two of them objected
to judicial review outright.' Indeed, only four of the eight justices
both expressly supported judicial review and voted to invalidate the
statute,102 and Randolph's letter to Madison reveals his impression
that the court had nearly dodged the question of judicial review
entirely."3
The Founders' obsession with restraining the national govern-
ment, however, nevertheless favorably disposed them to the idea of
checks on the legislative. As Amar has described, "judicial review
was less a unique attribute of judges than a symmetric counterpart
to the constitutional negatives enjoyed by coordinate branches."'0 4
The fact that the Founders did not explicitly provide for "judicial
99. WALLACE MENDELSON, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT 2 (2d ed. 1965).
100. MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 1, at 407.
101. Treanor, Prisoners, supra note 59, at 530-31.
102. Id. at 531.
103. Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Nov. 8, 1782), reprinted in 5 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 262, 263 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds.,
1967).
104. See AMAR, supra note 7, at 60-61 ("Modern Americans associate enforcement of the
Constitution with the doctrine of judicial review, under which judges refuse to enforce federal
statutes that they deem inconsistent with the supreme law of the Constitution. At the
Founding, however, the Constitution integrated several enforcement devices in its general
system of separated powers.").
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review" in the Constitution, 0 5 therefore, should not imply their
opposition to judicial checks on unconstitutional legislation.
III. PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW
A. The Basis for Presidential Review
Judicial review represented only one means through which the
Founders ensured that inappropriate legislative actions would be
constitutionally checked. Presidential review of laws, by contrast,
provided another. °" Though the Framers implicitly acknowledged
the existence of presidential review, documents from the Founding
and Enlightenment periods proved divided in the degree to which
they supported the practice.
105. See Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARv. L. REv. 4, 64 (2001). But see Prakash & Yoo, Origins, supra note 67, at 927 ("Fairly
read, the historical evidence indicates that at the time of the Constitution's drafting and
ratification, Americans generally regarded judicial review as an inevitable product of a
limited, written constitution with a separation of powers. The evidence also refutes the claims
of scholars who have asserted that the Founders did not regard the Constitution as
authorizing judicial review of federal statutes."). Prakash and Yoo continue to say that
"Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike understood that courts would be able to ignore
unconstitutional federal statutes. Just as significant, no scholar has been able to cite any
Federalist or Anti-Federalist who declared that the Constitution did not permit judicial
review of federal legislation." Id. at 928. But see supra note 36 and accompanying text
(showing that some Founders did oppose judicial review). They contend that the Supremacy
Clause, which implicitly authorizes judicial review, only entitles laws "made in Pursuance"
of the Constitution to constitutional supremacy. Prakash & Yoo, Origins, supra note 67, at
907. Rather than support judicial review, Kramer argues that the Framers intended popular
constitutional interpretation to be the exclusive means of constitutional interpretation. See
generally Larry D. Kramer, "The Interest of Man" James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism,
and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 697 (2006). Yoo and Prakash
dispute Kramer's claim. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, Questions for the Critics
of Judicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 354, 355-56 (2003) [hereinafter Prakash & Yoo,
Questions] ("[J]udicial review arises from provisions such as the Supremacy Clause and
Article III's vesting of the judicial power in the federal courts in all cases arising under the
Constitution and federal laws.").




1. Opposition to Excessive Executive Power
To be sure, the American constitutional system grew out of the
political ideals of the Enlightenment,0 7 which emphasized the
supremacy of the legislature in political affairs. 08 The 1689 English
Bill of Rights, for example, made it "illegal" for the executive to
suspend or dispense laws or the laws' execution. 09 In much the
same way, the Commonwealth of Virginia, which had served as an
early bastion of judicial review, took steps explicitly to limit the
powers of the executive. With language almost identical to that of
the English Bill of Rights, it strongly cautioned against executive
limitations of legislative pronouncements." 0 Before long, other
states-most notably Delaware.' and Vermont" 2-followed suit.
In fact, by the time the issue of executive power arose at the
Constitutional Convention, many of the delegates advocated
provisions that would strictly limit the executive's interpretative
authority. Madison, for instance, proposed that the Constitution
should vest the executive only "with power to carry into effect the
national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided
for, and to execute such other powers 'not Legislative nor Judiciary
in their nature,' as may from time to time be delegated by the
national Legislature."" 3 Though the delegates ultimately voted to
107. STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION & THE PRIDE OF REASON 21 (1998) ("The
American Constitution, we are accustomed to thinking, was a product of 'the Enlighten-
ment.').
108. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT § 150, at 270 (2d ed.
1887) (1689) ("In all cases, whilst the government subsists, the legislative is the supreme
power.") (emphasis added).
109. Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M., 2d. sess., c. 2, 16 Dec. 1689, in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 92, at 1, 2.
110. Virginia Declaration of Rights 12 June 1776, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
supra note 92, at 3, 3 ("That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any
authority, without consent of the Representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights,
and ought not to be exercised.").
111. Delaware Declaration of Rights 11 Sept. 1776, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
supra note 92, at 5, 6 ("That no Power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, ought to
be exercised unless by the Legislature.").
112. VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 1, art. 17 ("The power of suspending laws, or the execution of
laws, ought never to be exercised, but by the Legislature, or by authority derived from it, to
be exercised in such particular cases only as the Legislature shall expressly provide for.").
113. MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 1, at 39 (emphasis added).
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change this language, 4 they did so, according to Madison's de-
scription of their discussion, because the additional language
limiting executive action seemed superfluous. Charles Pinckney, for
example, "said [the additional words] were unnecessary, the object
of them being included in the 'power to carry into effect the national
laws.' 5
Even decades after the Constitution's ratification, Pinckney's view
persisted. 'The office of executing a law," William Rawle reflected,
"excludes the right to judge of it... ,,n6 Rather, "[a] prompt submis-
sion to the law, and an immediate preparation to enforce it, are
therefore absolutely necessary in relation to the authority from
which the law has emanated.""' 7 Rawle continued: 'The president
shall take care that the laws shall be faithfully executed.' The
simplicity of the language accords with the general character of the
instrument. It declares what is his duty, and it gives him no power
beyond it.""'
2. Support for a Moderate Review Power
Despite the fact that some Founders opposed presidential review
of legislative actions, others strongly supported it. William Symmes,
for example, acknowledged the broad swath of potential power that
the Constitution delegated to the President to ensure the laws'
faithful execution, rhetorically positing:
Should a Federal law happen to be as generally expressed as the
President's authority; must he not interpret the Act! For in
many cases he must execute the laws independent of anyjudicial
decision. And should the legislature direct the mode of executing
the laws, or any particular law, is he obliged to comply, if he
does not think it will amount to a faithful execution?" 9
114. Id. at 39-40.
115. Id. at 39 (internal footnote omitted).
116. WILLIAM RAWLE, AVIEW OF THE CONSTITUION OFTHE UNITED STATES OFAMERICA 147
(1829).
117. Id. at 147-48.
118. Id. at 149. And yet, Rawle also noted the difficulty of defining the exact scope of the
President's power, writing that "it would be at once unnecessary and impossible to define all
the modes in which [the executive power] may be executed ...." Id.
119. Letter from William Symmes to Captain Peter Osgood, in HERBERT J. STORING, 4 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 55-62 (1981).
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Similarly, Hamilton implicitly supported the idea of presidential
review in Federalist No. 70, contending that executive energy is
"essential ... to the protection of property against those irregular
and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the
ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the
enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy."120
This conception of the presidency as preserver of constitutional
freedom carries heavy interpretive undertones. If the President is to
protect against the "assaults" or "ambition" of the other branches,
for example, he must be vested with the authority to reach constitu-
tional interpretations that differ from the improper constitutional
determinations of those other branches.' As a result, he would
seemingly have the power to engage in constitutional review of
legislative judgments.
B. The Practicality of Presidential Review
On the one hand, it seems strange to envision the President of the
United States, who Hamilton repeatedly claimed would possess
powers comparable to those exercised by the governor of New
York,12 2 as a major interpreter of constitutional dogma. In other
words, if Hamilton intended The Federalist to reassure readers that
the President's powers would be largely constrained, why would it,
or any other Founding document, support the proposition that the
executive power could be extended to encompass constitutional
review?
120. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 421-22.
121. See, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 21, at 1287 (listing justifications for presi-
dential independence when interpreting the Constitution).
122. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 414 ("[I]f ... there be
a resemblance to the king of Great Britain, there is not less a resemblance to ... the governor
of New York. ... [t]here is a close analogy between [the President] and a governor of New York
.... "). Indeed, Hamilton devoted much of Federalist No. 69 to describing the similarities and
noting the few differences between the presidency and the governorship of New York. Id. at
420 ("Hence it appears that except as to the concurrent authority of the President in the
article of treaties, it would be difficult to determine whether that magistrate would, in the
aggregate, possess more or less power than the governor of New York."); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 67 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 405-06 ("The authorities of a
magistrate, in a few instances greater, in some instances less, than those of a governor of New
York, have been magnified into more than royal prerogatives.").
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On the other hand, Hamilton claimed that "[a] feeble executive
implies a feeble execution of the government,"'23 that "[a] feeble
execution is but another phrase for bad execution; and [that] a
government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in
practice, a bad government. 124
To synthesize both positions, then, perhaps Hamilton advocated
a limited executive power that nonetheless entailed constitutional
review as a necessary conduit to the exercise of the executive's other
powers. Put differently, by granting the President the "energy" to
engage in constitutional review, perhaps the Founders fortified the
express powers of the executive branch,'25 which ensured its ability
to check against both legislative encroachments and fraudulent
(i.e. unconstitutional) judicial interpretations. This insurance
proved necessary, Gouverneur Morris argued, because "the interest
of [the] Executive is so inconsiderable [and] so transitory, and his
means of defending it so feeble, that there is the justest ground to
fear his want of firmness in resisting incroachments. " 1" For prac-
tical reasons, Jefferson seemed to agree. "[T]he opinion which gives
to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional, and
what not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but
for the Executive also ... would make the judiciary a despotic
branch."'27
Jefferson's opinion indicates that the executive, like the judiciary,
possesses the power to adjudge what is constitutional within his
own sphere of conduct, and thus has the implicit duty to make
constitutional determinations. At some point, after all, every law
must be enacted and enforced. Because the President is involved in
both of these processes, 2 ' constitutional determinations inherent to
the processes must necessarily be included within the executive's
"sphere of conduct." Much like the judiciary is limited in the sense
that it can only adjudicate the sort of cases and controversies
123. THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 422.
124. Id.
125. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 319-20.
126. MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 1, at 297.
127. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 311 n.1 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897).
128. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 21, at 1280.
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outlined in Article III,129 so too is the executive limited by the
actions of the legislature. Rather than simply "make law," the
executive must wait for legislative pronouncements, 13° and interpret
those pronouncements only after they pass through him during the
legislative131 and enforcement processes. 132 This processes include
several instances in which the President may exercise, and which
the Founders believed that he would exercise, some degree of
constitutional review.
C. The Means of Presidential Review
As Judge Easterbrook wrote, "[p]residential review is ... a
counterweight to judicial review" that can help to control judicial
misinterpretation.133 It is equally important, however, to regard
presidential review as a "supplement" to judicial review-designed
to snag instances of congressional abuse that do not reach the form
of concrete cases that judges are constitutionally equipped to
decide.33 The means of presidential review, at least according to
Judge Easterbrook, manifests itself at four different stages in the
constitutional process: pardons, vetoes, additions, and proposals for
legislation.'35 Because this Note focuses on the American constitu-
tional system's ability to check unconstitutional statutes passed by
Congress, its discussion of presidential review will necessarily focus
129. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or
more States;-between a State and the Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of
different States,-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.").
130. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REv.
1, 10-11 (1993).
131. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 21, at 1303-04 (discussing the veto power).
132. See, e.g., id. at 1286-87 (describing a two-step process for interpreting a law).
133. Easterbrook, supra note 106, at 929. In other words, if judges get it wrong, the
President might get it right.
134. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive Duty To Disregard Unconstitutional
Laws, 96 GEo. L.J. 1613, 1639-40 (2008) (explaining the President's inability to obtain
declaratory relief or an injunction when the President believes a statute is unconstitutional).
135. Easterbrook, supra note 106, at 907.
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on the two of these four powers that were discussed in detail during
the Constitutional Convention: the pardon and the veto. It will also
focus on the President's ability to enforce selectively laws in ways he
deems constitutional-a proposition which overlaps with the
"additions" that Easterbrook described. 3 6
1. The Qualified Veto
The veto represents the first way in which the President can
defend the body politic from the poison of unconstitutional legisla-
tion. In describing that veto, Hamilton carefully distinguished
between the qualified negative that the Constitution bestowed on
the President 137 and the absolute negative possessed by the English
monarch.'38 He very clearly supported the idea, however, that the
Founders designed the presidential veto as a means of constitu-
tional review. 'The propensity of the legislative department to
intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other
departments," he wrote, "has been already more than once sug-
gested."'139 The veto, then, "not only serve[d] as a shield to the
executive, but it furnishe[d] an additional security against the
enaction of improper laws."'4 ° There was no danger of the President
using the veto too excessively, Hamilton claimed, because "a man of
tolerable firmness would [only] avail himself of [it as a] constitu-
tional means of defense, and would listen to the admonitions of duty
and responsibility."'' Instead of providing an avenue for potential
executive abuse, the veto created a means through which unconsti-
tutional legislation could be quickly and appropriately neutralized.
136. Id. at 908.
137. U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 3 ("Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the
Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a
question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before
the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be
repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules
and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.").
138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 415.
139. THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 441.
140. Id. ("It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the
community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the
public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body.").
141. Id. at 443.
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Most Founders agreed with Hamilton's implorations against the
wisdom of vesting the same absolute negative in the President
that the English constitution vested in the king.142 Indeed, the
Continental Congress complained of the king's refusal to "[a]ssent
to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public Good"
in the Declaration of Independence.' 41 Many Founders also agreed,
however, with Hamilton's assessment of the necessity of some
presidential negative. 4 4 Jefferson, for example, claimed that the
veto represented a "shield ... to protect against invasions of the
legislature .... ,,14' George Washington noted his "duty" to examine the
constitutionality of the national bank once its constitutionality had
been questioned. 46 Madison wrote of his presidential obligation to
veto unconstitutional laws.'47 And after following Madison into
office, James Monroe did likewise. "It is with deep regret," he noted,
"... that I am compelled to object [to the passage of the Cumberland
Road bill] ... under a conviction that Congress [does] not possess the
power, under the constitution, to pass such a law."'4 8 These
admissions clearly portray the veto as an exercise in constitutional
review.
Although the Constitution's text might not explicitly have au-
thorized substantive executive determinations of constitutional
validity, presidential review enables the President better to fulfill
142. See, e.g., EDWARD C. MASON, THE VETO POWER 20 (1890). But see MADISON, DEBATES,
supra note 1, at 51 (quoting James Wilson ("The Executive ought to have an absolute
negative. Without such a self-defence the Legislature can at any moment sink it into non-
existence.")).
143. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
144. But see MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 1, at 296 (noting that Elbridge Gerry supported
only a very limited veto ('The object he conceived of the Revisionary power was merely to
secure the Executive department [against] legislative encroachment.")). Gouverneur Morris
also expressed fears that the legislature would encroach on the executive branch. Id. at 407.
Hamilton would have agreed with these concerns. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander
Hamilton), supra note 5, at 442 (noting that "[t]he primary inducement to conferring the
power in question upon the executive is to enable him to defend" against encroachments into
his rights).
145. Jefferson, supra note 12, at 416, 420-21.
146. See Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 81, 84 (2007) (citing Letter from George Washington to Alexander
Hamilton (Feb. 16, 1791), in 31 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 215 (John C. Fitzpatrick
ed., 1939)).
147. Id. at 86.
148. Id.
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his sworn oath of office-that is, "to the best of [his] Ability, pre-
serve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.' 49
As Professor Prakash argued, '"The Constitution is not faithfully
executed when the President violates the Constitution himself,
assists the violations of others, or remains passive while others
violate it, or so the argument goes."'5 ° And allowing for the passage
of unconstitutional laws would no doubt violate the presidential
oath. Put more simply, "[ilt is as much the duty of ... the President
to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which
may be presented to [him] for passage or approval as it is of the
supreme judges when it may be brought before them for judicial
decision."' 1 Comparing the veto power even to the most revered
medical terminology, Prakash further noted that for the President
to refuse to exercise his constitutional judgment would be to violate
the "presidential equivalent of the Hippocratic Oath: 'Do no
constitutional harm.' 152
The veto power gives the President a weapon distinguishable
from the interpretive power granted to the Supreme Court: the
power to prevent a bill from becoming a law. Whereas nonen-
forcement of unconstitutional legislation does not "erase" a law from
the United States Code, the veto of such legislation-barring a
subsequent congressional override-actually prohibits the law from
taking effect.5 3 Certainly, there is no surer way to guard against the
infringement of constitutional power than to eliminate the infringe-
149. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 ("Before he enter on the Execution of His Office, he shall
take the following Oath or Affirmation:--'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully
execute the Office of the President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability,
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." (emphasis added)).
150. Prakash, supra note 146, at 83. Jefferson took the veto a step further. Not only was
it acceptable for the President to veto unconstitutional legislation, Jefferson wrote, but
sometimes practical considerations could surpass constitutional obligation, and the President
could go beyond even his constitutional boundaries where the nation's self-preservation was
at stake. See id. at 85 n.16.
151. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 576, 582 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896).
Constitutional Convention delegates briefly debated expanding the veto power to include
Congressional resolutions. MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 1, at 408-09. Madison made the
proposal, arguing that, "if the Negative of the President was confined to bills; it would be
evaded by acts under the form and name of Resolutions, votes & c ...." Id. Every state but
Massachusetts, Delaware, and North Carolina voted against the proposition. Id. at 409.
152. Prakash, supra note 146, at 83.
153. See, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 21, at 1306.
2244 [Vol. 50:2215
CLARIFYING DEPARTMENTALISM
ment from ever taking place, which is exactly the sort of power that
the President possesses with even a qualified veto.
2. The Pardon Power
With the pardon power, the Framers established a second means
of constitutional review."M According to James Iredell, a delegate to
the North Carolina ratifying convention, the Framers did this
because-even though they believed "that the laws should be rigidly
executed"-they realized the impossibility "for any general law to
foresee and provide for all possible cases that may arise.... "155 As a
result, it proved necessary to vest some government official with the
discretion to determine the instances in which it would be unwise
to apply otherwise proper legislative pronouncements. In placing
this discretion in the hands of the President, the Founders demon-
strated that the President, a person "of prudence and sound sense,
would be better fitted, than a numerous assembly, in such delicate
conjunctures, to weigh the motives for and against the remission of
the punishment, and to ascertain all the facts without undue
influence." '156
The Framers' pardon power can be used in two ways. First, it
entails review, not only of the substance of legislative pronounce-
ments, but of the validity of uniformly applying such pronounce-
ments. At its heart, this is constitutional review-for just as
statutes can be unconstitutional on their face (which would fall
within the realm of the veto), statutes can also be unconstitutional
as applied (which would fall within the realm of the pardon).15 v
Laws of this latter sort might be perfectly valid as a whole, but
might nonetheless fail to pass constitutional muster in particular
cases. In realizing that these situations should be left to the
President to determine, the Founders "impose [d] no restraint upon
154. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President ... shall have the Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.").
155. James Iredell, North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), in 4 THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
156. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1493 (1833).
157. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 21, at 1302-03.
2009] 2245
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
[the President] by requiring him to consult others ...." before making
his pardoning decisions."'
Second, and more obviously, the pardoning power can be also
used to check against conduct that is rendered unacceptable by
facially unconstitutional legislation."9 The President can use
pardons of this remedial sort to nullify legislation that he might not
have viewed as unconstitutional at the time it initially passed, or to
discontinue unconstitutional statutes signed into law by a previous
President. Jefferson, for example, pardoned those individuals con-
victed under the Alien and Sedition Acts, which were passed under
his predecessor, 16 ° on the grounds that Congress had enacted those




A third means of constitutional review consists of the President's
ability to enforce (or not enforce) unconstitutional legislation.
Rooted in the constitutional charge to the President to "faithfully
execute" laws,'62 the President's power of execution necessarily
entails some measure of constitutional interpretation.16 After all,
when a President enforces a law, he often does so without the
benefit of a Supreme Court ruling on the law's constitutionality.
16 4
The President must thus enforce the law according to his best
judgment. Certainly, in doing this, he takes into account the
expressed intention of Congress by examining the four corners of
158. RAWLE, supra note 116, at 178.
159. Lawson & Moore, supra note 21, at 1302-03.
160. See An Act Supplementary to and To Amend the Act, Entitled "An Act to Establish an
Uniform Rule of Naturalization, and to Repeal the Act Heretofore Passed on That Subject,"
1 Stat. 566 (1798) (repealed 1802); An Act Concerning Aliens, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired); An
Act Respecting Alien Enemies, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (expired); An Act in Addition to the Act,
Entitled "An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States," 1 Stat.
596 (1798) (expired).
161. Prakash, supra note 134, at 1617; see 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 155, at 540-44
(Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799); see also AMAR, supra note 7, at 61 (noting that the
new Republican House impeached Samuel Chase for misconduct in one of the impeachment
trials, and only narrowly escaped conviction).
162. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
163. Lawson & Moore, supra note 21, at 1280.
164. Prakash, supra note 134, at 1645.
2246 [Vol. 50:2215
CLARIFYING DEPARTMENTALISM
the law that it passed. But the Framers did not require Congress to
account for every conceivable contingency when exercising its
lawmaking power because, frankly, such a task would be impossible
for Congress to perform. When Congress passes a law, it necessarily
passes a general rule."6 5 Just like the Supreme Court adjudicates the
constitutionality of general statutes by hearing specific cases, so too
does the President determine the specific constitutional application
of a general statute by deciding how, and in what circumstances, to
enforce it.
The President's interpretive independence becomes further
evident from the realization that the Framers did not indicate how
he should enforce legislation, only that he should enforce it.' 66 This
grant of discretionary power ensured that executive actions would
require some degree of interpretive autonomy from the legislative
and judicial spheres. Although Congress might place statutory
limits on executive discretion, the enforcement power ultimately
rests with the President.'67
Many Founders understood the necessity of a flexible enforcement
power. In defending the executive's ability to make pronouncements
about the laws he had been charged to enforce, for example, St.
George Tucker remarked that "the obligation upon the President to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed, drew after it this
power, as a necessary incident thereto."'68 In the constitutional
debates, George Mason and James Madison similarly moved to
include within the presidential oath the phrase "and will to the
best of my judgment and power preserve protect and defend the
Constitution of the U.S.," which strongly implied an ability to both
enforce and interpret congressional legislation.'69 And even decades
after ratification, when the Supreme Court decided Worcester v.
Georgia,'v Andrew Jackson strongly suggested that the President's
decision whether enforce a particular rule (e.g., a statute or a
judicial precedent) is based on his determination of rule's constitu-
165. For the President's need to interpret a vague statute, see Lawson & Moore, supra note
21, at 1286.
166. See Prakash, supra note 134, at 1675-77.
167. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking,
36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 465-66 (1987).
168. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSToNE'S COMMENTARIES 346 (1803).
169. MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 1, at 472 (emphasis added).
170. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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tional merits. 'Vell, John Marshall has made his decision," Jackson
purportedly snapped, "now let him enforce it."
1 71
Although the Founders most likely intended the '"Take Care
Clause" 172 to prevent the sort of flagrant refusal to enforce legisla-
tion that Jackson's response to Worcester so aptly demonstrated,1 73
Presidents remain textually unconstrained in enforcing legislative
enactments. The same ambiguous '"Take Care Clause" that implies
that the President must execute laws also leaves open the possibil-
ity that the President should not execute laws that undermine the
constitutional text. In other words, if a President has an obligation
to ensure the faithful execution of laws, and he faithfully executes
an unconstitutional law, it would appear that he has simultaneously
undermined the higher law (e.g., the Constitution) that he must also
faithfully enforce. To avoid a logical contradiction, then, the
Framers must have intended presidential nonenforcement to in-
clude the power of constitutional review.
IV. AMERICAN DEPARTMENTAL THEORY OF GOVERNMENT AND
DEDUCTIVE JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Because the Framers clearly intended both judicial and presiden-
tial review to occur, it is necessary to discuss the framework of how
each power could occur in relation to the other. To do that, however,
it is also helpful to describe the general theory of government under
which the Framers justified a split in interpetive power between
multiple constitutional actors. Best characterized as "departmental
theory of government," this idea best reflects the Framers' support
for a system that empowered the executive and the judiciary to each
make its own constitutional determinations.
171. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 518 (1996) (internal
citation omitted). Though Jackson directed his challenge to the Supreme Court (rather than
to Congress), the tone of his words nevertheless demonstrate the degree to which the
President's discretion in deciding how and when to exercise his or her enforcement power
implicates some level of constitutional review-especially because Jackson disagreed with the
constitutional basis of Marshall's decision.
172. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[Hie shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed
173. See Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving
the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 893-94 (1994).
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After discussing a general view of American departmentalism,
this Note will then proceed to do something that the Framers did
not: define how, in a departmentalist system, the powers of each
branch meshed together as part of one cohesive whole. To say that
the Framers desired departmentalism, in other words, does not
explain how they distributed power within their departmentalist
creation. The remainder of this Note will discuss the department-
alist view necessary to support the judicial and presidential review
previously discussed and propose a theoretical model (e.g., deductive
judicial supremacy) to explain how the Framers' believed those
powers would hierarchically interrelate.
A. The Reasoning Behind the American Departmental Theory of
Government
In rationalizing the American constitutional system, Thomas
Jefferson described an idea that theorists would later label
"departmental theory."'74 According to Jefferson, "each department
[of the national government] is truly independent of the others, and
has an equal right to decide for itself... the meaning of the constitu-
tion in the cases submitted to its action."'75 Similarly, Madison
argued that both the executive and the judiciary can make their own
decisions about the Constitution's text. Each branch, he wrote,
"must, in the exercise of its functions, be guided by the text of the
Constitution according to its own interpretation of it....'  As
Professor Michael Paulsen notes, "a logical consequence of this
[view] ... is that the executive, no less than the judiciary, has, within
the sphere of its powers, independent authority to review the acts
of the other two branches ..... ,177 And in a sense, this sort of interpre-
tive sovereignty is all "departmental theory" really means. It
represents the right of each branch to make its own constitutional
174. See, e.g., James B. Staab, The Tenth Amendment and Justice Scalia's "Split
Personality," 16 J.L. POL. 231, 260 (2000).
175. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), quoted in CHRISTIAN
G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 374 n.57 (2007).
176. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power To Say What
the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 234-35 (1994) (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 240.
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determinations, sometimes irrespective of the decisions made by
other branches.17
8
Although it is true that not all scholars of departmentalism
believe that the President can decline to follow judicial decisions, 179
this Note contends that the Founders conceptualized the executive
as an independent constitutional actor empowered to exercise his
own constitutional discretion. In other words, by granting a wide
array of interpretive powers to both the executive and the courts,
the Framers provided for a departmental system of government in
which interpretive authority would be divided among coordinate
branches. No one branch would possess the ability to adjudicate the
constitutionality of its actions for other branches. Instead, each
branch would prevent the other branches from unconstitutionally
abusing their power to infringe upon the powers of the other
branches, or undermining the Constitution that gave each of the
branches life.
Madison implicitly acknowledged the reasonability of a depart-
mental system at the Constitutional Convention, where he proposed
a council of revision to review congressional legislation that would
consist of both the President and the Supreme Court."' He wrote, for
instance, that
[e]very bill ... shall, before it becomes a law, be severally
presented to the President of the United States, and to the
judges of the supreme court for the revision.... If, upon such
revision, [the President and Supreme Court] shall approve of it,
they shall respectively signify their appropriation by signing it;
but if, upon such revision, it shall appear improper to either, or
both, to be passed into a law, it shall be returned, with the
objections against it, to that house, in which it shall have
originated...,."'
178. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE SUPREME COURTAND JuDIcIAj REVIEW INAMERICAN HISTORY
4 (1985).
179. See, e.g,, David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 113, 115-16 (1993) (arguing for a moderate form of departmentalism under which
presidential power to interpret independently the Constitution is tied to whether prior courts
have ruled on the issues that the President desires to decide).
180. MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 1, at 405-06.
181. Id. at 406.
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This proposed council of revision effectively created a joint veto
power for the President and the Supreme Court. Though the other
delegates ultimately rejected this proposal," 2 they did not com-
pletely alter the framework underlying Madison's suggestion.
Although the council of revision would have reviewed legislation
before it ultimately passed, the ratified Constitution allowed for the
same degree of ex ante review, while also providing a measure of
continual ex post review. Put more simply, the Constitution affords
the President the power to sign bills into law, at which point he
decides, ex ante, whether the law is constitutional. Then, after the
law takes effect, the Constitution permits the Supreme Court, ex
post, to hear cases involving both the substance and application of
the law. Such a system accomplishes the same goals and utilizes
the same actors as the proposed council of revision. Indeed the only
difference between this framework and the framework suggested by
Madison's proposal is that constitutional review is exercised by each
of the actors at times different from one another-a fact which
might represent a check in and of itself.
Because Madison desired to give a veto to both the judiciary and
the executive, his proposal shows that he implicitly viewed the
executive veto and the judicial interpretive power on similar grounds.
When coupled with Hamilton's notes about the necessity of presi-
dential review to preserve constitutional integrity i8 3 and the
historical understanding of judicial review at the time of the
Founding,"M it becomes clear that the Framers viewed constitu-
tional review by the executive and judicial branches as depart-
mental measures that combined to check improper congressional
actions. The inherent strength of the legislature, in other words,
created the need for two branches to harness its potentially abusive
power.
James Wilson echoed the need to double-check legislative
prerogative by questioning whether the Convention "guarded
[against] the danger [of legislative abuse] ... by a sufficient self-
defensive power either to the Executive or Judiciary department."'85
Such an extreme check proved necessary, he argued, because the
182. Id.
183. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
184. See supra Part II.
185. MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 1, at 408.
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legislature could easily become the most despotic branch. "After the
Destruction of the King in Great Britain," Wilson argued, "a more
pure and unmixed tyranny sprang up in the parliament than had
been exercised by the monarch."'86 Displaying an equal trepidation
for legislative power, Madison wrote in Federalist No. 48 that "[tlhe
judiciary and the executive ... were left dependent on the legislative
[branch] for their subsistence in office, and some of them for their
continuance in it."' 7 He continued: "If, therefore, the legislature
assumes executive and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be
made; nor, if made, can be effectual; because in that case they may
put their proceedings into the form of acts of Assembly, which will
render them obligatory on the other branches."'' 8 Thus, it became
necessary for the American constitutional government to provide
a legislative control. The departmental system of interpretation
that the Framers' created fulfilled this need. Indeed, modern
scholars have widely conceded that the American Constitution
reflects, even at a very basic level, some form of departmentalism.8 9
To be sure, Madison's admonitions against legislative encroach-
ment on the judicial and executive powers did not mean that the
Framers rigidly defined each branch's appropriate spheres.
Certainly, each branch possessed some "core" powers within the
Framers' constitutional system. For Congress, this core power was
essentially legislative. For the President, it was executive. And for
the Supreme Court, it was interpretive. Madison acknowledged,
however, that in many cases, there would be some overlap between
each branch's powers. 9 ° He excused this overlap so long as there
was not "too great a mixture" between the branches.' 9 ' In making
this assessment, Madison realized that by passing and enforcing
laws, Congress and the President necessarily possessed some
interpretive powers-despite the fact that the power of "interpre-
tation" represented the "core" power of the Supreme Court-and
186. Id.
187. THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 308.
188. Id.
189. Lawson & Moore, supra note 21, at 1270. But see id. n.7.
190. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 5, at 300 ("[Tjhere
[was] not a single instance in which the several departments of power have been kept
absolutely separate and distinct.").
191. Id. at 304.
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plainly demonstrated his belief in departmental constitutional
review.
B. Deductive Judicial Supremacy Generally Defined
Deductive judicial supremacy provides one means to rationalize
the Framers' departmentalist creation. Such a system admits that
"[i]n a republic, judges are not theoretically the lawgivers.' 92 It also
posits, however, that judges are in a unique position to interpret
what the laws mean. In contrast to inductive judicial supremacy,
which specifies that the law is what judges declare that it is,"'
deductive judicial supremacy presupposes that, as Justice Joseph
Story famously remarked in the landmark case of Swift v. Tyson,'
judicial opinions are "only evidence of what the laws are.' 95
Deductive judicial reasoning, therefore, considers opinions to be like
"prophecies"-they might provide the best indicator of what laws
stand for, but need not necessarily dictate what the law is.'96 Judges
do not displace lawmakers; they instead decipher each law's
constitutional genetic code.
The rationale for deductive judicial supremacy is two-fold. First,
courts are regarded as "relatively more expert" than other branches
of government in interpreting constitutional issues.'97 Judges
presumably have more experience with constitutional issues than
other branches of government, and, consequently, might be in a
more favorable position to determine an issue's constitutionality.
Second, and somewhat contrarily, judges' expertise within the
field of constitutional issues need not stop other branches from
making their own constitutional determinations. The legislature,
for example, makes a threshold determination of constitutionality
before passing a particular law, and the President, as previously
192. Paul L. Colby, Two Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial Opinions,
61 TuL. L. REv. 1041, 1041 (1987).
193. Id. at 1047 ("A principal consequence of induction as the accepted method of legal
reasoning is the doctrine that nonparties must adhere to judicial opinions. This doctrine gives
judicial opinions legislative effect, thereby bestowing on adjudicators the power of a
lawgiver.").
194. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
195. Id. at 18.
196. See Colby, supra note 192, at 1045.
197. See, e.g., Hardin v. Ky. Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 14 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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discussed, makes determinations of constitutionality when deciding
to sign or enforce the act of the legislature.198 This constitutional
framework vests multiple actors with interpretive discretion, under
the assumption that the degree to which judges remain faithful to
the Constitution determines the degree to which their opinions are
followed by other coordinate branches of government.'99
Under this view, judicial opinions provide the best guidepost to
constitutional legitimacy, but despite the wishes of those who argue
for inductive judicial supremacy, they need not be the only guide-
post. To the contrary, in a departmental system of government,
judicial opinions merely represent, by the system's very definition,
the interpretation of one coordinate department."' Of the available
interpretations, those opinions might be regarded with the most
weight, but they need not necessarily always predominate.
V. A FRAMEWORK UNDER WHICH DEDUCTIVE JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
INFORMS DEPARTMENTALISM IS MOST CONSISTENT WITH THE
FRAMERS' VISION OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
Given both the Framers' decision to endow multiple political
organs with the power of constitutional review and their non-
specificity about how those powers should relate to one another, this
Note argues that the modern theoretical concept of deductive
judicial supremacy provides a useful benchmark to analyze the
Framers' vision of American departmentalism. To understand
exactly how the Framers' vision advances deductive judicial
supremacy as the preferred form of departmentalism, however, it is
helpful first to revisit a familiar constitutional analogue. This
analogue provides a fluid framework that, if slightly altered to
reflect the interpretive process, can illustrate how deductive judicial
supremacy provides a filter on (ordinarily ad hoc) departmentalism
and comports with the Framers' vision of constitutional review.
198. See supra Part III.
199. See Colby, supra note 192, at 1059-60.
200. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
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A. Justice Jackson's Proposed Constitutional Framework
In the Steel Seizure Case,2"1 Justice Jackson established a
constitutional framework to describe how the President and
Congress relate to one another. "Presidential powers," he wrote, "are
not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or
conjunction with those of Congress. 2 °2 According to Jackson, the
President is strongest when he acts pursuant to the express or
implied authorization of Congress." 3 In those circumstances, his
powers include not only all the authority that the Founders
delegated to the presidency in the Constitution, but also the powers
given to him by Congress.0 4 The opposite is true when the President
"takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will of
Congress," for then "[the President's] power is at its lowest ebb, ...
[as he] he can only rely on his own constitutional powers minus any
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."2 5 In between
those two areas of action, Jackson claimed, there existed a "zone of
twilight" over which the President and Congress have "concurrent
authority."20 6 In those situations, "congressional inertia, indifference
or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable,
if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibil-
ity."207
In other words, Justice Jackson defined the extent of the execu-
tive's power by referencing two entities: first, the Constitution, and
second, Congress. As the more powerful entity, as well as the
party responsible for making the laws that often authorize pres-
idential action, Congress provides the clearest guidance whether a
President's actions are legally acceptable. Though Congress cannot
interfere with the core powers that the Constitution grants to the
President, the President is always most powerful when he acts
pursuant to a congressional mandate.
201. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
202. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 635-36.
204. Id.
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Justice Jackson's concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case is now
heavily valued for its explanation of how each branch's constitu-
tional powers relate to one another, and it is widely applied to
evaluate the constitutionality of presidential action. °" Indeed,
Justice Jackson's framework "has become the starting point for
constitutional discussion of concurrent powers."2 °9
But to what extent can Justice Jackson's framework also apply to
the Framers' vision of constitutional interpretation? In other words,
if Jackson's framework might serve as a model of how the branches
act in relation to each other, why should a similar model not also
accurately describe how the Framers thought the branches would
interpret the Constitution in relation to each other? In light of
deductive judicial theory, it therefore becomes necessary to re-
calibrate Justice Jackson's Steel Seizure Case framework to produce
a model for describing the Framers' vision of constitutional interpre-
tation.
B. Recalibrating Justice Jackson's Framework To Describe the
Framers' Vision of Constitutional Review: Departmentalism
Within a Deductive Judicial Supremacy Context
1. Step One: Determining Which Branch Should Possess the
Greatest Interpretive Power
Given that both presidential and judicial review are necessary
constitutional safeguards on the legislature's power,210 which
208. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory Powers, 68
VA. L. REv. 1, 10-12 (1982) (noting that the Steel Seizure Case proves the "principal modern
authority on the relationship between the President and Congress," and that Justice
Jackson's concurrence is now regarded as the most influential component of that decision);
Paul Gewirtz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 343, 352
(1989) (same). Justice Jackson's framework has also proven applicable to evaluating
presidential action in the foreign affairs context. See, e.g., Richard Henry Seamon, Domestic
Surveillance for International Terrorists: Presidential Power and Fourth Amendment Limits,
35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 449, 468 (2008). But see HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY CONSTITUTION 142 (1990) (arguing that though Justice Jackson's concurrence
articulates "with unusual clarity ... the concept of balanced institutional participation" in
foreign affairs, Supreme Court jurisprudence has "dramatically [altered] the application of
Justice Jackson's tripartite analysis in cases on foreign affairs").
209. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRSAND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 94-96 (1996).
210. See supra Part W.A.
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process of constitutional review did the Framers envision as
dominant? To approach this question in a different way, did the
Framers envision judicial supremacy or presidential supremacy?
And if the former, did the Framers envision a system of deductive
judicial supremacy, which "conceives of judicial opinions as nothing
more than explanation of actions taken" or as "evidence of what the
laws are"?211 Or did the Framers intend to create a system of
inductive judicial supremacy-under which judicial opinions were
essentially given a legislative effect, "thereby bestowing on adjudica-
tors the power of a lawgiver"?212 The former construct would allow
the President to determine the constitutionality of laws that affect
his particular sphere, while nevertheless acknowledging that the
judiciary plays a vital interpretive role in explaining the law. The
President, then, could (and perhaps should) take the judiciary's
constitutional determination into account. The latter construct, on
the other hand, would completely nullify the executive constitu-
tional prerogative once a judicial judgment has been made. In
essence, the Supreme Court's constitutional judgment would be the
only judgment that mattered.
The answer to these questions is two-fold. First, as earlier
demonstrated, the Founding documents illustrate that the Framers
did intend a system of judicial supremacy. And second, the Fram-
ers' clear provision for a departmental system of constitutional
interpretation, which envisioned both the President and the
Supreme Court as major arbiters of statutes' constitutionality, is
more compatible with a system of deductive judicial supremacy than
it is with a system of inductive judicial supremacy. In other words,
within their departmental creation, the Framers intended the
judiciary to be the most convincing authority on the constitutionality
of legislative actions.
As Marshall noted in Marbury v. Madison, for example, "it is
emphatically the province of the judiciary to say what the law is. '213
Madison held similar views. Referring to the Supreme Court as an
impartial tribunal free from the entanglements of other branches,
he claimed that the Court "[was] clearly essential to prevent an
211. Colby, supra note 192, at 1045 (internal citation omitted).
212. Id. at 1047-48 ("[O]ne may conclude, as Chief Justice Hughes said of the Constitution,
that the law is 'what the judges say it is.").
213. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it
ought to be established under the general rather than under the
local governments." '214 Hamilton emphatically claimed that "[t]he
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the
courts." '215 The veracity of this claim is especially telling when
juxtaposed to Hamilton's comparison of the presidency to the
governorship of New York" 6 and his imploration that the judiciary
had the duty to adjudicate questions of constitutionality.217 The
strong implication of these statements is that the judiciary's role
within the federal government is distinctly interpretive. For
Hamilton, this unique role meant that the judiciary's constitutional
interpretations should necessarily predominate over the other
branches' constitutional interpretations-even if the judiciary
remained less powerful in other, noninterpretive areas.21 In other
words, "the courts of justice ... [uniquely served] as the bulwarks of
a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments. 21 9
Multiple state legislatures seemed to agree with Hamilton's as-
sessment-acknowledging that the Framers had reserved statutory
interpretation to the judicial branch. 220 And even those Founders
who opposed the Constitution commented upon the broad interpre-
tive power reserved to the Supreme Court.2 ' Though in many ways
the Framers believed in the power of presidential review, they did
not speak of presidential review in the same direct way in which
they spoke of judicial review.222
Although the Framers intended to vest the judiciary with a large
degree of interpretive discretion, however, they did not intend for
courts to be the sole arbiter of constitutionality. It is no coincidence,
214. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
215. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 467.
216. See supra note 120.
217. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 468.
218. Id. at 464 (noting that the Supreme Court possess "neither FORCE nor WILL but
merely judgment").
219. Id. at 468.
220. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
221. Melancton Smith, Letters from the Federal Farmer (Oct. 1787), reprinted in FOUNDING
AMERICA: DOCUMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE BILL OF RIGHTS 461 (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
2006) ("It is a very dangerous thing to vest in the same [Supreme Court] power to decide on
the law, and also general powers in equity; for if the law [restrains it], [it need] only to step
into [its] shoes of equity, and give what judgment [its] reason or opinion may dictate.
222. See, e.g., supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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for instance, that the presidential oath of office obliges the President
to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
States '223 rather than to "preserve, protect and defend the Constitu-
tion of the United States as interpreted by the Supreme Court." The
veto224 and pardon powers 22 are also not limited in that way. And
the Take Care Clause 2 6 does not say that the President "shall take
Care that the Laws, or the Supreme Court's pronouncements of
Laws, be faithfully executed." In other words, even though the
Framers' description of the judiciary's role makes clear that, at least
within the area of constitutional interpretation, they intended for
the judiciary to predominate, the Constitution's implicit support for
presidential review also reveals a departmental system in which
multiple constitutional actors engage in meaningful constitutional
review.
2. Step Two: Applying the Framework
After considering the Framers' belief that judges might perhaps
provide the best indication of constitutionality, consider Justice
Jackson's concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case, in which he
established a structural system of government under which-true
to the Framers' intentions-the legislature represented the most
powerful branch. Now, keeping in line with the Framers' system of
checks and balances, employ a similar framework to describe the
structure of constitutional review. Only this time, imagine that the
balance of power among the three branches is shifted to fit a mold
similar to that supporting deductive judicial supremacy. In other
words, the judiciary, rather than the legislature, is the most
powerful interpretive branch.
Under this framework, the legislative and executive interpretive
powers are at their zenith when those branches' constitutional
interpretations fall in step with the Supreme Court's constitutional
determinations. Each branch, however, possesses a certain "sphere"
of power with which the other branches cannot constitutionally
223. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
225. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
226. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 ("[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted....").
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interfere. The Supreme Court cannot tell a President, for example,
to veto a law. It cannot tell the President the circumstances under
which he is able to pardon criminal offenders. And, as is plainly
obvious from the circumstances surrounding Worcester v. Georgia,
the Court cannot force the President to honor judicial decisions.227
Though "the courts ... are to be considered the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments, 228 they have "no
influence over either the sword or the purse ... ,,229 The Supreme
Court cannot, in other words, give efficacy to its own judgments.
Instead, the Framers believed that Supreme Court rulings would
serve as the most appropriate barometer of constitutionality. The
Court is not the only arbiter of constitutional validity. After all,
since the Justices possess "neither FORCE nor WILL"230 to effec-
tuate their opinions, those opinions cannot stand alone. When
combined with other means of reviewing congressional legislation,
however, the Framers' constitutional vision becomes clear. Best
captured by the framework that Hamilton outlined in Federalist No.
78, the Framers' system is one in which the judge, in classic
deductive style, "declare [s] the sense of the law." '231 The burden then
falls on the President, in exercising the powers inherent to his own
sphere (that is, the veto, pardon, and enforcement powers) to enforce
the law in a manner consistent with the constitutional judgments
of the Supreme Court. This system of departmental theory, filtered
through the lens of deductive judicial supremacy, best reflects the
interpretive matrix of constitutional review that the Framers
intended. This system also ensures that, in the words of Justice
Jackson, "the Constitution diffuses power [to] better ... secure
liberty [and] ... enjoins upon its branches separateness but interde-
pendence, autonomy but reciprocity.""2 2
For these reasons, this Note argues that Justice Jackson's Steel
Seizure framework adequately reflects the Framers' vision of
hierarchical departmentalism and comports with the structural
integrity of the Constitution. Though this Note does not advocate
227. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
228. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 468.
229. Id. at 464.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 467.




intentionalism as a general interpretive theory, the ambiguity with
which the Framers defined the relationship between the different
forms of constitutional interpretation that are implicit in the
Constitution's text warrants pragmatic reconsideration of the
Framers' structural intentions when formulating American
government. Under the framework this Note has suggested, both
the President and the Supreme Court may disagree in their
interpretations of laws. As a logical consequence of this disagree-
ment, the President may choose to enforce a law in a way that
directly challenges a Supreme Court decision. Because the Supreme
Court can provide the best assessment of a statute's constitutional-
ity, however, the Framers believed that the President should
attempt to align his own constitutional determinations (in the form
of vetoes, pardons, and enforcement) with Supreme Court precedent
-assuming such precedent is readily available. By so doing, the
President would ensure interpretive uniformity and demonstrate
how Justice Jackson's proposed framework can provide a consistent
interpretive model for American constitutional review.
Some scholars view Justice Jackson's framework and the notion
of departmentalism to be at odds with one another.233 This Note
takes the opposite position-arguing that Justice Jackson's
framework, when properly applied, can inform departmentalism
rather than detract from it. Instead of representing an end at odds
with the Framers' vision of departmentalism, Justice Jackson's
framework could just as easily constitute a means to achieve it.
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical. Congress
passes a bill pursuant to its Article I, Section 8 powers. At the point
the President signs this bill into law, he believes that it is constitu-
tional. Similarly, after the President signs the bill into law, he only
enforces it in a way that he believes is constitutional. Nevertheless,
a citizen challenges the constitutionality of the law in court-
perhaps on the grounds that, as applied to him, the law constitutes
a "taking" in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The case gradually
makes it to the Supreme Court, and the Court sides with the
affected citizen-striking down the law as applied to the citizen, but
allowing it to remain in effect as a general statute. In response to
233. See, e.g., MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 248 (1977) (suggesting that the Steel Seizure Case dealt "a telling blow
to the ... doctrine ... that each branch of government was the arbiter of its own powers and
responsibilities").
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the Supreme Court's ruling, the President realizes that the law
might also be unconstitutional as applied to other citizens, and
consequently, changes the way in which he enforces the law as a
whole to prevent citizens like the one who filed suit from being
negatively affected by the law's application. In the case of nationally
imposed criminal laws, the President might also pardon convicted
offenders, refuse to prosecute various suspected offenders, veto the
law before it takes affect, or refuse vigorously to execute an
unconstitutional law signed by a previous President until the
current President receives a meaningful Supreme Court judgment
on the law's constitutionality.
In this proposed hypothetical, both the President and the
Supreme Court engage in meaningful constitutional review. The
President does so at the time the law initially takes effect (in
deciding to sign, not veto, the proposed bill). The Supreme Court
does so when the citizen sues to alter the law's application to him.
And the President does so a second time after the Supreme Court
issues a ruling indicating that the law might not be as uniformly
constitutional as the President initially believed. The President's
enforcement decision is made stronger by virtual of its overlap with
the Supreme Court's decision because both branches present a
uniform interpretive front against the congressional statute they
challenge.
As seen in this hypothetical, deductive judicial supremacy does
not assume away departmentalism. Rather, it acknowledges it. It
also ensures that departmentalism is appropriately checked-
filtering it through a Justice Jackson-like framework that ade-
quately reflects the Framers' vision of constitutional review. This
particular model of deductive judicial supremacy also takes into
account the interpretations of all three national, constitutional
actors (Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court) in a way
consistent with the Framers' conception of constitutional checks and
balances.
Certainly, the President faces no binding obligation to conform
his own constitutional determinations to those of the Supreme
Court (as would be the case in a system of inductive, rather than
deductive, judicial supremacy). Given that one of the major purposes
underlying the acceptance of constitutional review is to prevent the
passage of unconstitutional legislation, however, the American
government could best protect itself against such legislation if the
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President and the Supreme Court exercised their powers of consti-
tutional review in collaboration with one another. Otherwise, it
would be more difficult for any branch appropriately to control
improper legislation. If there exists an interpretive disagreement
over a statute's constitutionality, for example, the statute implicitly
appears less legitimate. If, on the other hand, the President
reasonably defers to Supreme Court precedent, both branches could
eliminate unnecessary confusion and ensure that Congress's
unconstitutional actions are most effectively checked. This check
reflects the sort of constitutional review that the Framers intend.
Though it is sometimes appropriate for the President and the
Supreme Court to disagree in interpreting congressional statutes
(demonstrating the need for both judicial and presidential review),
interpretive uniformity is certainly preferable to interpretive dis-
uniformity. Using Justice Jackson's framework as a structural
model for interpretive sovereignty would contribute to this unifor-
mity in a way consistent with the Founding documents, and thus
prevent Congress from realizing its potential as the government's
"most despotic branch." '234 The President checks the legislature at
the front end (through the veto power, the pardon power, and the
enforcement power) until the Court hears cases challenging the
validity of statutes, at which point the Court can issue rulings with
which the President can attempt to comply. In this way, multiple
constitutional actors exercise constitutional review over congressio-
nal judgments, and Congress is most appropriately checked.
CONCLUSION
In the Constitution, the Framers created a system of government
in which both the executive235 and the judiciary36 checked the
legislature by each engaging in meaningful constitutional review.
Yes, the Constitution did not expressly provide for either "presiden-
tial review" or "judicial review." And yes, the Constitution even
failed to establish a standard of interpretation under which such
review, if it did exist, should be properly exercised. The historical
context of the Founding, however, strongly suggests that the
234. See supra notes 9, 185-86 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part III.
236. See supra Part II.
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Framers regarded both presidential review and judicial review as
necessary bulwarks to a constitutional system premised upon the
notions of balance and divided authority.
When evaluating the framework of constitutional review, then, it
is necessary to keep in mind the way in which the Framers believed
presidential and judicial review should relate to one another. In
other words, although the Framers made sure that the executive
and the judiciary remained supreme within their own respective
areas of constitutional interpretation, they also viewed judicial
review as providing perhaps the most telling explanation of constitu-
tionality.237 As a result, executive constitutional interpretation is
most accurate when it coincides with judicial constitutional
interpretation, even though the executive is not necessarily bound
by judicial decisions and certainly maintains a sphere of discretion
in which he possesses distinct interpretive sovereignty. This
paradigm of deductive judicial supremacy, which reconciles multiple
forms of constitutional review within one departmental framework,
best reflects the Framers' intended constitutional design.
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